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ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS AND
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: FIRST
TIME TRAGEDY,
SECOND TIME FARCE
ROBERT

D.

SNOOK*

INTRODUCTION

For over twenty years, the environmental citizen suit has had
the potential to be, and has occasionally functioned as, an impor
tant tool that empowers individual citizens to protect their local en
vironment and assist in directing environmental policy through
private enforcement actions. Unfortunately, in certain circum
stances, the effectiveness of the citizen suit as a tool has been lim
ited by a battery of procedural barriers raised by polluters and
others. Some of these barriers are found in the text of statutes and
others derive from federal common law. 1 The defendants raising
these barriers include the usual list of suspects, such as industrial
manufacturers and real estate developers, but also include local
governments. 2 It is self-evident that industry defendants oppose
citizen suits as a cost matter. However, it is interesting that govern
ment regulators sometimes side with defendants in citizen suit

* Assistant Attorney General for the State of Connecticut; J.D., Western New
England College School of Law; M.S., University of Massachusetts; B.S., University of
Massachusetts. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not nec
essarily reflect those of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut.
1. See, e.g., Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (text
of statute bars citizen suit), superseded by 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S.
20 (1989). For various common law doctrines barring citizen suits, see the following
cases: Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir. 1995)
(abstention); Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124
(2d Cir. 1991) (mootness); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
918-20 (5th Cir. 1983) (primary jurisdiction); Orange Environment, Inc. v. County of
Orange, 923 F. Supp. 529, 538-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (mootness); Davies v. National Coop
erative Refinery Ass'n, 43 ERC 1224, 1228-29 (D. Kan. 1996) (abstention and primary
jurisdiction); and Student Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge &
Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (D.N.J. 1984) (primary jurisdiction), affd, 759 F.2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
2. See Hallstrom, 831 F.2d at 890 (county government); Orange Environment, 923
F. Supp. at 530 (county government); Davies, 43 ERC at 1225 (private company).
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cases. This may stem from a belief that "[c]itizen activism in envi
ronmental ... enforcement ... can lead to tension between the
government and the governed. The government may fear that citi
zen involvement in environmental enforcement will disrupt its own
enforcement efforts and reduce its flexibility to tailor enforcement
decisions to particular circumstances"3 as well as consume scarce
public funds on issues that may be of secondary importance. The
irony of the situation becomes apparent when one realizes that
even as government regulators side with defendants against private
citizens, government officials lavish praise on the citizen suit pro
cess generally.4 All the while, Congress, unwilling to correct certain
obvious inadequacies in the statutory sections, continues to copy
these sections verbatim from one environmental statute into an
other, thereby preserving the textual flaws and ambiguities.
What was Congress's intent in providing essentially the same
citizen suit provision in all modern environmental laws? Have they
fulfilled that purpose, and, if not, what barriers have prevented
this? Finally, what needs to be changed, either judicially or legisla
tively, to reinvigorate the citizen suit process?
It is the thesis of this Article that citizen suits, as they are cur
rently drafted and interpreted, fail to fulfill their true potential.
The defects in the text of various citizen suit provisions, and the
inconsistent interpretation given them by the courts, prevent pri
vate parties adversely affected by pollution from acting effectively
in the absence of government enforcement. Simultaneously, citizen
suits, as they are currently employed, discourage the business com
munity from cooperating with government agencies
correcting
known environmental problems. Finally, citizen suits, as currently
used by various private groups, seriously interfere with effective
government regulatory action because the initiation of a citizen suit
removes the threat of an enforcement action, which is the principal

ip

3. Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, A Comparative Look at the Role of Citizens ill Envi
ronmental Enforcement, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., June 1997, at 29, 29.
4. As one Senate report stated, "[c]itizen suits are a proven enforcement tool.
They operate as Congress intended-to both spur and supplement . . . government
enforcement actions. They have deterred violators and achieved significant compliance
gains." This same report added: "In the past two years, the number of citizen suits to
enforce NPDES permits has surged so that such suits now constitute a substantial por
tion of all enforcement ... under this Act." S. REP. No. 99-50, at 28 (1985); see also
Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part II, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. 10063, 10063 (1984) [hereinafter Miller, Part II]; Doris K. Nagel, Com
ment, Environmental Law-Citizen Suits and Recovery of Civil Penalties, 36 U. KAN. L.
REV. 529, 532 (1988).
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coercive mechanism available to regulators. These suits can force a
government agency to expend a significant part of its diminishing
public resources to address matters that may be of significance to a
few well-financed individuals and organizations, but may ultimately
prove to be of limited importance to protecting the environment.
.This Article concludes that these deficiencies may be resolved
if the courts, or preferably Congress, permit the development of a
unified theory that identifies when an administrative enforcement
action will be deemed sufficient to bar initiation of an independent
citizen suit. Specifically, it is advanced that a private citizen should
be prohibited from bringing suit against an alleged polluter if an
appropriate federal or state administrative agency has (i) brought
suit in federal or state court with respect to the specific acts in ques
tion, (ii) entered into an administrative consent order with the vio
lator, or, in very limited circumstances, (iii) entered into a formal
memorandum of understanding with the violator. Development of
such a theory will inevitably place effective veto power over envi
ronmental enforcement in the hands of government regulators, but
will preserve the rights of citizen plaintiffs to act when the govern
ment cannot or will not do so.
Part I of this Article generally examines the text and legislative
history of the citizen suit provisions. Part II discusses the case law
relevant to an interpretation of these provisions. Part III advances
a modest proposal for the revision of these statutes.
.
I.

A.

STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Statutory Language of Citizen Suit Provisions

All major environmental laws, specifically the Clean Air Act,S
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the
Clean Water Act,6 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"),7 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),8 as well as a host of
less well known environmental laws, such as the Toxic Substances
Control Act,9 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act,lO contain essentially the same citizen suit provisions. l l They
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

42 u.s.c. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
42 U.S.c. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
30 U.s.c. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
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all trace their origin to section 304 of the Clean Air Act. In the
beginning, Congress exhibited a "tendency to literally 'lift''' section
304 of the Clean Air Act and "inc1ude[] [it] in all new federal envi
ronmental statutes or major statutory amendments."12 Subse
quently, several courts used the case law between statutes
interchangeably.13
The text of the citizen suit provisions is deceptively simple. For
example, the Clean Water Act states the following:
No action may be commenced
(1) under subsection (a)(l) of this section
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of
the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State
in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged
violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is dili
gently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States, or a State to require compliance with the stan
dard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of
the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of
right.14

Consequently, there are but two conditions which must be met in
order to file a citizen suit. First, the citizen plaintiff must give notice
to the violator, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), and any relevant state agency before acting. Second, the
suit may be commenced only if the appropriate government agency
is not already "diligently prosecuting" its own action.1 5
11. See 15 u.s.c. § 2619; 30 U.S.c. § 1270; 33 U.S.c. § 1365; 42 U.s.c. §§ 6972,
7604, 9659; see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987),
superseded by 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); Miller, Part II,
supra note 4, at 10063.
12. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part
I, 13 ENVTL. L. REp. 10309, 10311 (1983) [hereinafter Miller, Part I].
13. See Hallstrom, 844 F.2d at 600 ("At least eight environmental statutes contain
identical or similar provisions. Courts have construed these provisions identically de
spite slight differences in wording." (citations omitted»; Roe v. Wert, 706 F. Supp. 788,
.792 (W.D. Okla. 1989) ("No circuit has addressed the sixty (60) days notice provision of
section 9659. However, it is informative that some circuits have addressed the notice
requirements of various other environmental statutes.").
14. 33 U.S.c. §1365(b) (1994). Other statutes differ only slightly, usually to re
flect structural differences in the laws. See sources cited supra note 11. Note also that
CERCLA originally did not have a citizen suit provision but the 1986 SARA amend
ments added one almost identical to the provision quoted above. See Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1703
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 9659 (1994».
15. See Proffitt v. Rohm & Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988) ("There are
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As discussed below, these two elements, the notice require
ment and the diligent prosecution requirement, as well as a number
of common law and prudential doctrines, have formed the crux of
efforts by opponents to block or delay citizen suits.16 Poor drafting
and worse interpretation of these two statutory elements has led to
the successful prevention of citizen suits.17 The vague drafting and
inconsistent interpretation, however, have not occurred in a vac
uum. Conversely, they are the inevitable result of a "tension" in
herent in Congress's attitude towards citizen participation in the
enforcement process, specifically, the tension between Congress's
intent to encourage citizen participation in environmental enforce
ment and Congress's simultaneous desire to prevent citizen inter
ference with government enforcement. 18 This tension is most
clearly revealed in the legislative history behind the citizen suit
prOVIsIons.
The legislative history of the citizen suit provisions itself has an
interesting history of interpretation. Specifically, this author has
previously argued that the pertinent legislative history complicates,
rather than clarifies, the understanding of this statute because it
presents two different and inherently contradictory positions taken
by Congress with respect to citizen suits: (i) citizen suits are to be
encouraged in order to aid government enforcement efforts; and
(ii) citizen suits should be curtailed in order to avoid infringing on
the discretion of administrative agencies. 19 Another commentator
has expressed it differently, suggesting that the citizen suit provi
sions unequivocally express Congress's desire to secure citizen par
ticipation in environmental enforcement, but that there was a
subsequent struggle to direct the nature of such participation. Spe
cifically, "[t]here is a difference ... between encouraging citizens to
strike out on their own and encouraging them to inspire the agency
who is supposed to do the job. "20
only two limitations on the right of the citizen to bring suit. First, the citizen must give
sixty days' notice. . .. Second, a citizen may not bring his or her own action if the
'Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal
action in a court of the United States ...."'); see also Miller, Part II, supra note 4, at
10063-64.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 591 F.
Supp. 345, 351 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
18. 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 64 (1986).
19. See Robert D. Snook, Citizen Suits After Hallstrom· Can a Plaintiff Avoid
Dismissal After Failing to Give Sixty Days' Notice?, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 8
(1991).
20. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 63.

316

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:311

Whether characterized as a struggle about citizen participation
or the form of that participation, the legislative history contains
helpful references for those opposed to citizen suits. It is these ref
erences that several courts have used to defeat citizen initiatives,
and it is therefore helpful to examine the legislative record.

B.

Legislative History of the Citizen Suit Provisions

Some of the comments by legislators involved in passage of the
various citizen suit provisions suggest that Congress viewed citizen
suits as an inexpensive alternative to government enforcement, and
that the provisions were therefore included in an effort to en
courage the EPA, or relevant state agencies, to act when appropri
ate. 21 From these comments, it appears clear that Congress, at least
in part, believed that the provisions would allow citizens to act as
private attorneys general and enforce the laws directly.22 Implicit
in this approach was the view that individual citizens, because they
would be directly affected by the pollution, would be especially mo
tivated, and thus uniquely effective, advocates. Furthermore, it was
assumed that the EPA was understaffed and its resources
inadequate. 23
Alternatively, there were some who viewed citizen suits with
suspicion, fearing that the citizen suit provisions would cause a
flood of litigation, thereby blocking the courts and hindering the
government's own regulatory actions.24 In addition, some authori
ties were concerned that citizen suits, because they are not con
trolled by a single national agency, would result in haphazard
application of environmental laws. 25
As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that "[c]itizen ini
tiatives to enforce the ... pollution laws [were] encouraged in vari
ous ways, notably by allowing recovery of the costs of litigation,
including attorney's and expert witness fees, and extending inter
vention as of right in related cases."26 "This explicit prodding of
citizen action [was] blurred somewhat by the legislative insistence,
21. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
22. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing
S. REP. No. 91-1196, at 35-36 (1970».
23. See 116 CONGo REC. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
24. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
25. See Nagel, supra note 4, at 532-33; L. Ward Wagstaff, Note, Citizen Suits and
the Clean Water Act: The Supreme Court Decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa
peake Bay Foundation, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 891, 894 (1988).
26. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 63.
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equally vehement, that the citizen suit section is -cbnstructed in a
way 'to encourage and provide for agency enforcement'" by virtue
of the notice and diligent prosecution requirements. 27 Interestingly,
the dichotomy of opinion referred to above can be found in the
legislative history of each of the environmental laws beginning with
the Clean Air Act and running through the reauthorization debates
for CERCLA.
For example, with respect to the first view, some in Congress
said during the legislative debates surrounding passage of the Clean
Air Act that the suits were permitted in order "to both goad the
responsible agencies to more vigorous enforcement of anti-pollu
tion standards and, if the agencies remained inert, to provide an
alternative enforcement mechanism."28 Senator Muskie stated that
"[s]tate and local governments have not responded adequately [to
the need for enforcement]. It is clear that enforcement must be
toughtened [sic]. . . . More tools are needed, and the Federal pres
ence and backup authority must be increased."29 Indeed, it was be
lieved that "[g]overnment initiative in seeking enforcement under
the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing citizens to
bring suits for violations ... should motivate governmental ... en
forcement and abatement proceedings."3o
Opponents of the provisions claimed that insisting on the need
for alternative private enforcement in effect denigrated the profes
sionalism of the responsible government agencies. 31 Therefore, as a
second justification for introducing citizen suits, Senator Muskie ar
gued that citizen suits provided a valuable source of assistance to
the overworked agencies: "I think it is too much to presume that,
however well staffed or well intentioned these enforcement agen
cies, they will be able to monitor the potential violations. "32
Thus, in regard to citizen suit provisions generally, the legisla
tive history of the Clean Air Act supports the view that Congress's
intent was to push government regulators to greater enforcement
action and to supplement their thinly stretched resources. As one
article noted, citizen suits were designed to "expand the scope of
27. Id.
28. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing S.
REP. No. 91-1196, at 35-36 (1970».
29. 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR Acr AMENDMENTS OF 1970
226 (1974); see also S. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-39.
30. S. REp. No. 91-1196, at 36-37; see also Miller, Part II, supra note 4, at 10064.
3l. See Miller, Part II, supra note 4, at 10064.
32. 116 CONGo REc. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska).

318

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:311

enforcement without burdening public funds and encourage public
authorities to enforce environmentallaws."33
An entirely different view of the role of private parties is seen,
however, with· regard to the inclusion of the notice and diligent
prosecution provisions. The very existence of these sections implies
that Congress was hesitant to allow unfettered citizen access to the
courtS.34 For example, Senator Hruska remarked, "[t]he function
ing of the department could be interfered with, and its time and
resources frittered away by responding to these suits."35 Conse
quently, the two previously mentioned restrictions were placed on
citizen suits to assure that they would complement, and not inter
fere with, federal regulatory and enforcement programs. "This is
confirmed by ... the precluding of [citizen] suits if a compliance
action is being 'diligently' prosecuted."36 As one court noted, these
two sections combined suggest that "Congress intended to provide
for citizens' suits in a manner that would be least likely to clog al
ready burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger govern
mental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief."37
As noted above, the citizen suit provisions first described in the
Clean Air Act were copied, essentially verbatim, in each of the suc
ceeding environmental laws passed over the following two decades.
In most cases there was little discussion of the need for citizen suits
or how to provide for such suits. To the extent there was any dis
cussion of the issue, it tended to simply echo the arguments heard
during passage of the Clean Air Act.
For example, during passage of the Clean Water Act, what lit
tle is found in the legislative history with respect to citizen suits
reiterates the point that "if the agency had not initiated abatement
proceedings following notice or if the citizen believed efforts initi
ated by the agency to be inadequate, the citizen might choose to
file" a citizen suit. 38 The record continues, pointing out that the
courts would then examine the agency's actions to determine if they
were adequate and would then permit, consolidate, or dismiss the
33. Wagstaff, supra note 25, at 894.
34. See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985).
35. 116 CONGo REC. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
36. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 63.
37. Baughman V. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting
City of Highland Park V. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975» (citing 116 CONGo
REC. 32,926 and 33,102 (remarks of Senator Muskie); 116 CONGo REc. 33,183 (remarks
'
of Senator Hart».
38.S. REp. No. 92-414, at 80 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3746.
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cItlzen action as required. 39 It is clear that citiien actions were
deemed supplementary to agency proceedings, and further, that the
courts were to act as arbiters of whether such private efforts could
continue in the face of some form of governme~t enforcement. 4o
This is not to say that citizen participation was to be discouraged.
"The [EPA] and the State should actively seek, encourage and assist
the involvement and participation of the public in . . . enforce
ment."41 However, note that in two adjacent paragraphs, the legis
lative history refers on the one hand to its "[c]oncern" about
"frivolous and harassing [citizen] actions," and on the other hand,
to "legitimate [citizen] actions" as "a public service."42 Thus, even
in the brief references to citizen suits in the Clean Water Act, there
is evidence that Congress viewed such actions as both a valuable
public service and as a potential threat to environmental enforce
ment at the same time.
Similarly, during the CERCLA reauthorization debates, sev
eral representatives commented on the absence of a provision al
lowing citizens to sue in cases of imminent endangerment (as is
permitted by RCRA) and complained that "[t]he argument that cit
izens' suits would interfere with an energetic and well organized
cleanup program simply is not supported by the facts. "43 In fact,
the House Report expressly stated that the notice and diligent pros
ecution requirements would prevent such private enforcement ac
tions from impeding government efforts.44 For reasons that will be
of interest later, it should be noted that the Report added that dili
gent prosecution might include either the actual filing of a lawsuit
by the EPA or some other "aggressive" enforcement action, such as
an administrative order. 45 Any such activity could constitute a suf
ficient bar
to ensure that such enforcement actions will not be deterred by
the diversion of resources that such suits might otherwise engen
der. The bars are also necessary to avoid the confusion or termi
nation of settlement negotiations because EPA, a State, or
potentially responsible parties face citizen suit litigation relative
39. See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746.
40. See id., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746.
41. [d. at 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3679.
42. [d. at 81, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747.
43. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 289-90 (1985), reprinted in 1986 u.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2964-65.
44. See id., pt. 3, at 35-36, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3058-59.
45. [d., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3058-59.
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to matters under negotiation. The basic concept is that the pur
pose of citizens suits is to augment, not duplicate, government
enforcement efforts. Consequently, instances where EPA or a
State are involved in good faith negotiations will be protected
from the drain and disruption that might otherwise be created by
citizen suits. 46

It is thus clear that, as late as the 1986 reauthorization debates

for CERCLA, Congress continued to be of two minds with respect
to citizen suits: first, that citizens should be granted wide latitude to
protect themselves, and simultaneously, that citizen suits pose a
threat to government enforcement that should be restricted to lim
ited circumstances.
The "inherent tension between citizen as independent agent
and as conscience of the public authorities is reflected in both the
statute and the case law."47 For example, the Second Circuit has
stated that "citizen suits ... reflect[] a deliberate choice by Con
gress to widen citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and
effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and en
forced."48 Other courts have examined the same legislative history
and found that the limitations on citizen suits were the result of
Congress's "inten[t] to give the EPA an opportunity to resolve is
sues regarding the interpretation of complex environmental stan
dards by negotiation, unhindered by the threat of an impending
lawsuit,"49 and "thereby reduce the volume of costly private envi
ronmentallitigation."50
Congress's efforts to hammer out a compromise to allow citi
zens to sue, yet preserve the overall authority of government regu
lators, has resulted in a badly fractured legislative history that
provides judges abundant opportunity to justify expanding or re
stricting the citizen suit provisions as they see fit. Consequently,
there is not a consistent and logical interpretation of when a given
government enforcement effort will be deemed to be adequate, and
therefore, when a citizen suit will be prohibited.
46. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3058-59.
47. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 64.
48. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976).
49. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1985); see also
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 20 (1989)
("[L]egislative history reftect[s] Congress's belief that ... citizen enforcement through
the courts should be secondary to administrative enforcement by the EPA.").
50. Walls, 761 F.2d at 317.
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CASE LAW

The starting point for judicial interpretation of citizen suits is
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 51 In Gwaltney, the Court
stated that the purpose of citizen suits is to supplement, not sup
plant, government enforcement. 52 Interestingly, the Gwaltney
Court concluded that it is necessary to free enforcement agencies
from citizen suits that might impede their freedom of action in or
der to avoid unnecessarily limiting the discretion of government au
thorities. 53 The Court at one point noted the following:
Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could
undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit.
This danger is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that the
Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a com
pliance order . . . . Suppose further that the Administrator
agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the con
dition that the violator take some extreme corrective action, such
as to install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it
otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit,
months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the
Administrator chose to forgo, then the Administrator's discre
tion to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed
considerably. 54

The complexity of the issues involved necessitates dividing the
decisional law subsequent to Gwaltney into two sections: one for
notice and one for diligent prosecution.
A.

Notice

Following Gwaltney, the primary case of interest with respect·
to the notice requirement is Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,55
which concluded, consistent with the Supreme Court's generally
strict view of citizen suits, that notice is a mandatory jurisdictional
prerequisite, the absence of which unequivocally bars a suit. 56 In
Hallstrom, the Court came down firmly on the side of those who
would restrict the rights of citizens to bring private enforcement ac
tions, concluding that the language of RCRA is mandatory and re
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

484 U.S. 49 (1989).
See id. at 60.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 60-6l.
493 U.S. 20 (1989).
See id. at 33.
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quires notice before suit may be filed. 57 The Court buttressed its
holding by stating that the legislative history indicated that Con
gress was concerned with avoiding burdening the judicial system
with a flood of litigation if citizen suits were permitted too gener
ously.58 The Supreme Court, however, did not define what consti
tutes notice. The Court's silence on this point left open the slim
possibility that citizen plaintiffs could escape a motion to dismiss if
they had provided the defendant polluter with some form of written
communication at least intimating a meaningful possibility of a
lawsuit.59
Several post-Hallstrom courts have found ways to avoid a lit
eral interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding. For example, in
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co. ,60 a district court
judge held that
a strict application of the notice requirement can be procedurally
unwieldy for litigants and courts. For instance, a strict applica
tion of the notice requirement would require a plaintiff to send
an additional notice to the EPA, state administrator and permit
tee for every subsequent permit violation occurring after the suit
was filed. 61

The court went even further and relaxed the element of the notice
requirement that mandates listing the character of the violation,
thus informing plaintiffs that they need only "illuminate the param
eters that have been exceeded."62
Other courts have similarly found ways to blunt the effect of
Hallstrom. For example, in City of New York v. Anglebrook Ltd.
Partnership ,63 and in Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercu
les, Inc. ,64 courts discovered sufficient flexibility in the statutory
. text, and the Hallstrom decision, to hold less formal notice to de
fendants and the EPA to be sufficient. 65 In effect, these courts were
willing to stretch the definition of what constitutes notice to include
57. See id.
58. See id. at 28-29. It should be noted that the Court cited the legislative history
of the Clean Air Act, because that Act's legislative history is evidently the most
extensive.
59. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 998
(W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
60. 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
61. Id. at 77.
62. Id.
63. 891 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
64. 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995).
65. See id. at 1248; Anglebrook, 891 F. Supp. at 905.
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informal letters and other communications in an effort to avoid dis
missing a citizen suit.
Under no circumstances, however, should citizen plaintiffs be
lieve that they can count on generous treatment for technical notice
deficiencies. The Supreme Court's holding in Hallstrom is clear:
notice is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and not a procedural
nicety.66 As a practical matter, there is little room for argument
regarding the Supreme Court's holding. Although some courts
have been willing to stretch matters somewhat, others have been
happy to bar citizen suits for failings of the notice requirement that
appear minor indeed. For example, in National Environmental
Foundation v. ABC Rail Corp. ,67 the court applied the notice re
quirement rigorously and added, in an interesting aside, "that an
other purpose behind the notice requirement of Section 1365 is to
effectuate Congress's preference that the Act be enforced by gov
ernmental prosecution."68 The court thus articulated a view of citi
zen suits that appears to have been held by many in Congress
during the debates (specifically those who repeatedly expressed
their fears that citizen suits would interfere with government initia
tives) and by many in the judiciary (such as the Supreme Court),
but was rarely expressed so succinctly.
Ultimately, the best advice that can be given to citizen plain
tiffs with regard to the notice requirement is to abide by the terms
of the statute precisely and to provide the EPA and the putative
defendant with timely notice of the fact that a suit is contemplated,
who the defendants are, the violations complained of, and the stat
utes under which suit will be brought. Even if a court might be
willing to overlook deficiencies in notice, it may be a waste of re
sources fighting the issue, and the Hallstrom decision gives defend
ants a powerful weapon to delay or derail citizen suits at their
onset.
B.

Diligent Prosecution
1.

Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.

Like the notice provision, "little or no judicial guidance exists
66.
67.
68.
sion that

See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 33 (1989).
926 F.2d 1096 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id. It should be noted that the court provided no justification for its conclu
Congress would prefer governmental enforcement.
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as to what constitutes ailigent prosecution."69 Unlike the notice el
ement, the diligent prosecution requirement has not benefitted
from efforts at clarification by the Supreme Court. As discussed
below, the lack of statutory definition and the hazy legislative his
tory have engendered contradictory opinions. This has served to
confuse practitioners and offer judges with any set of predilections
an array of precedent to support any conclusion they so choose.
An early example of a discussion centering on the diligent
prosecution requirement can be found in Baughman v. Bradford
Coal Co.,7° in which the Pennsylvania Department of Environmen
tal Resources began an administrative action against Bradford Coal
Company for civil penalties related to certain violations of the
Clean Air Act.n Subsequently, a group of private citizens seeking
similar penalties initiated an action in federal district court with re
spect to the same violations. 72 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit stated that "[g]enerally, the word 'court' in a
statute is held to refer only to the tribunals of the judiciary and not
to those of an executive agency with quasi-judicial powers."73 The
court added that "[n]evertheless, an administrative board may be a
'court' if its powers and characteristics make such a classification
necessary to achieve statutory goals."74 Interestingly, the court
found that the administrative agency in question (the Pennsylvania
DEP) did not have the authority to provide relief that is "the sub
stantial equivalent to that available to the EPA in federal courts,"
and also found that it did not afford citizen involvement as a matter
of right.75 The court therefore held that the administrative action
under review was substantively different from a judicial proceeding
and that the agency was therefore not a "court" for purposes of the
Clean Air Act.76
The Baughman decision is important for several reasons. It
was the first decision to hold that administrative proceedings could
be the equivalent of judicial actions and, therefore, that such pro
ceedings could bar a simultaneous citizen suit. 77 Furthermore, the
69.
Inc., 579
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Student Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott,
F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979).
Seeid.at217.
See id.
/d.
Id.
Id. at 219.
See id.
See id. at 217.
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significance of the Baughman court's reasoning can be recognized
by evaluating citizen suits in the context of regulatory actions. Spe
cifically, regulatory agencies are not always eager to take a violator
to court because any court action is an expensive gamble, especially
if the perceived violations are considered relatively minor. In such
cases, government agencies may instead choose to enter into an ad
ministrative consent agreement.
The form and content of such consent agreements vary from
state to state. As a general rule, these agreements, which are ulti
mately ratified by a court, are made between the agency and the
offending party. The offending party agrees to perform certain ac
tions, such as cleaning a site, stopping certain emissions, or paying a
fine, and, in return, the agency refrains from filing suit.78 Often,
such agreements include a stipUlation that noncompliance with the
consent agreement will automatically result in penalties and/or an
injunction.79
Such agreements are, of course, favored by regulators, because
they generally offer a practical solution to the environmental con
cern and accomplish the goal of protecting the public at a small
fraction of the cost of litigation. As one court noted, "[b ]ypassing
the time and expense required by litigation is an obvious plus."80
Furthermore, such agreements often achieve more for the protec
tion of the environment than a conventional lawsuit, because a
greater portion of the settlement amount is likely to be used for
clean-up as opposed to attorneys' fees.
Finally, consent agreements are generally quick and efficient
mechanisms for resolving an issue. "The courts have long recog
nized that public policy favors settlements as a cost-efficient means
of resolving disputes and conserving judicial resources. "81 This is
especially true in environmental actions, because consent agree
ments "relieve the government of considerable burdens on its lim
ited resources."82 Even if successful, a lawsuit takes years,
particularly if appeals are involved. Consent agreements can be fi
nalized in a few months and allow the remediation to start before
the contamination spreads further. Time, therefore, is a critical fac
tor in remediation efforts.
78. See, e.g., EPA, OSWER DlREcrJVE No. 9835.17, MODEL CERCLA RDIRA
CONSENT DECREE (1991).
79. See id. § XXI.
80. United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 567 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
81. Id. (citing Kiefer Oil & Gas Co. v. McDougal, 229 F. 933 (8th Cir. 1915)}.
82. Id.
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Alternatives to Baughman

It must, however, be remembered that other courts have not
been willing to extend the language of the citizen suit provisions. In
fact, two circuits have expressly rejected Baughman. 83
.
Specifically, inFriends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted
that the language of the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water
Act expressly limits citizen suits if an action is proceeding "in a
court of the United States, or a State."84 The court continued, stat
ing that the inclusion of the citizen suit provisions reflects a desire
on the part of Congress to encourage citizen participation in enforc
ing environmentallaws. 85 The court concluded that "[t]o interpret
[the section] to include administrative as well as judicial proceed
ings is in our view contrary to both the plain language of the statute
and congressional intent. "86
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "[w]e prefer the Second
Circuit's reading of section 1365 over the Third Circuit's reading.
Section 1365 does refer specifically to 'courts,' and it makes no di
rect or veiled reference to any type of administrative proceeding. "87
Noting that other statutes specifically state that a citizen suit is pro
hibited if either a judicial or administrative action is pending, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]his contrast dispels any lingering
ambiguity."88

3.

Developments Since Baughman

While it is true that Baughman has been rejected in the Second
and Ninth Circuits, it has been followed elsewhere. 89 For example,
in Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail
Corp. ,90 the court adopted the reasoning of the Baughman decision
and added that "[t]here is no question, and the parties do not disa
83. See Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987);
Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985).
84. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d at 62.
85. See id. at 63.
86. Id.
87. Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d at 1525.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d
1320 (7th Cir. 1991); Sierra Club v. Colorado Ref. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993);
North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 755 F. Supp. 484 (D.
Mass. 1991), affd, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991).
90. 591 F. Supp. 345 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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gree, that ... administrative proceedings may, as a general proposi
tion, be deemed the equivalent of state court action under [the
citizen suit provisions]."91 The court then turned to an examination
of the nature of the administrative procedure in question and con
cluded that "[b]ecause [the state agency] is empowered to impose
civil penalties on violators in amounts up to $10,000.00 a day, to
seek criminal penalties, and to require the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief, its actions have generally been found to rep
resent the statutory equivalent of court action."92 The court con
cluded that the administrative action was sufficient evidence that
the enforcement agency was diligently prosecuting an action against
the polluter though no lawsuit was ever filed. 93
Other courts have also followed Baughman. In North and
South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate ,94 the Massa
chusetts Department of Environmental Protection entered into a
consent decree in 1987 with the Town of Scituate with respect to
violations of the Massachusetts Clean Water Act, a statute which
the judge declared to be comparable to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act ("FWPCA").95 Two years later, a citizens group
brought an action in federal court under the federal law for the
same violations. 96
The district court dismissed the case, finding that the consent
order "represent[ed] a substantial, considered and on-going re
sponse to the violation," and therefore constituted "diligent en
forcement."97 In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the
consent order was not evidence of the required diligence, the dis
trict court stated the following:
Congress's express intent "to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, re
duce, and eliminate pollution," ... cautions against so confining
an interpretation. Indeed, the statute calls for a more deferential
approach that does not circumscribe the administrator's discre
tion to implement a plan that, in his expert judgment, adequately
addresses a violation. 98
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 348.
Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted).
See id. at 350-53.
755 F. Supp. 484 (D. Mass.), affd, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991).
See id. at 486.
See id. at 484.
Id. at 487.
Id.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

328

[Vol. 20:311

Interestingly, in reviewing the decision of the district court, the
First Circuit made the following statement:
The focus of the statutory bar to citizen's suits is not on state
statutory construction, but on whether corrective action already
taken and diligently pursued by the government seeks to remedy
the same violations as duplicative civilian action. . . . Duplicative
enforcement actions add little or nothing to compliance actions
already underway, but do divert State resources away from reme
dying violations in order to focus on the duplicative effort. 99

4.

Specific Issues in Determining Diligent Prosecution

It is clear, therefore, that some courts view the citizen suit pro
visions as expressing a preference for government regulatory ac
tion, and these courts will look hard for reasons to block citizen
suits that are perceived as infringing on government prerogatives or
wasting government assets.IOO On the other hand, as discussed be
low, citizen plaintiffs have had numerous successes after Baughman
in demonstrating that government administrative actions are not
sufficiently diligent to forestall private actions. Typically, citizen
plaintiffs prevail when there has been (i) a history of noncompli
ance,lOl (ii) the imposition of trivial penalties,102 and (iii) no citizen
participation. lo3
For example, in New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New
York City Department of Sanitation,l04 the defendant Department
of Sanitation made the tactical mistake of claiming that the Depart
ment of Natural Resources had been diligent in its oversight of the
defendant's Pelham Bay Landfill,lo5 The court, in between refer
ences to the "sordid details of this bureaucratic and political
nightmare,"106 responded that such a claim "cannot be taken seri
99. North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552,
556 (1st Cir. 1991).
100. See North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc., 755 F. Supp. at 487 (concluding
that the agency's actions were "substantial, considered and ongoing," because they in
cluded a fixed timetable and expressly left open the possibility of future civil and crimi
nal actions against the polluters).
101. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanita
tion, 772 F. Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
102. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 470, 491 (D.S.C. 1995).
103. See Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 841 (S.D. Ohio 1996);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 491.
104. 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
105. See id. at 164.
106. [d. at 163.
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ously in light of the fact that relief is not in sight [for at least four
more years)."107 The court went on to note that the state had been
involved since 1983, and, based on the state's own timetables for
correcting the problems, "at least twelve years will run before the
problem is rectified. This is not diligent prosecution."108 The court
then directed attention to the 1985 Order as "a perfect example of
the state's lack of diligence," and held up to scorn the state's efforts
in the 1985 Order to set up a temporary remediation plan (which
took three years) while seeking compliance with the 1985 Order.109
After reviewing the defendant's responses to the 1985 Order,
the court concluded that "[t)he state was acting as a pen pal, not a
prosecutor."110 Turning then to the 1990 Order, the court noted
that it permitted the defendants to pollute for five more years while
failing to develop a permanent plan as required by the 1985 Or
der. 1l1 "It is simply incomprehensible that the discharge of leachate
. . . which was to be a temporary measure adopted to remedy the
problem, should continue for seven years. . .. This is precisely such
an instance when the government has not been fulfilling its
duties."112
If nothing else, this case shows the folly of using the diligent
prosecution defense in cases where there is a long history of official
de facto recognition of noncompliance, complete with toothless
consent orders and general incompetence. Particularly damning in
this regard are situations in which government efforts proceed over
many years without demonstrable effect and smack of over-cozy re
lationships with polluters.
Another factor of importance in determining if regulators have
indeed been diligent is the amount of fines imposed in relation to
total potential fines recoverable under the relevant statutes. For
example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services (TOC), Inc.,113 Laidlaw faced fines potentially totaling up
to $2.27 million and negotiated an actual fine of only a modest
$100,000.1 14 Interestingly, the court specifically noted that, contrary
to the policy of using fines and penalties to remove any economic
107.

Id. at 170.
Id. at 168.
Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 169.
112. Id.
113. 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995).
114. See id. at 491.
108.
109.
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incentive for polluting, this reduced fine included no amount re
flecting the economic advantage enjoyed by the company for failing
to abide.1 15
Another factor influencing the court to rule in favor of the citi
zen plaintiffs was the fact that the defendant was permitted by the
regulatory agency to draft and file the complaint against itself; this
included the defendant paying the required filing fee. 116 In addi
tion, it appeared that the consent order was completed in unusual
haste, such haste in fact that the private plaintiffs were effectively
denied an opportunity to participate.1 17
The absence of an opportunity for true citizen intervention was
again found to be a reason to hold that there was no "diligent pros
ecution" in Frilling v. Village of Anna. 118 In Frilling, the court de
clined to find that a state's actions were diligent primarily because,
while the state had invoked an administrative proceeding, there had
been no formal adversary process, hearing, or witnesses, and the
citizens were never permitted to intervene or even comment on the
enforcement action. 119
While the above cases clearly show that attempts to sanitize
past violations by pressing compliant regulators into ludicrously
convenient consent orders will often backfire, the citizen plaintiff
should not believe that reduced penalties or good agency-industry
relationships will automatically prevent a violator from barring a
citizen suit. For example, in Connecticut Fund for the Environment
v. Contract Plating Co., 120 the state settled with a violator for a
mere $3,500. 121 The citizen plaintiffs argued that their action cov
ered issues not found in the consent order. The court, however,
ruled that "[t]he mere fact that the settlement [was less comprehen
sive] than the remedy sought in the instant action [was] not suffi
cient in itself to overcome the presumption that the state action was
diligently prosecuted."122 The court's conclusion highlighted an im
portant principle; specifically, that the context in which most chal
115. See id. at 491-92.
116. See id. at 479.
117. See id.
118. 924 F. Supp. 821, 838 (S.D. Ohio 1996); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 489-90 (finding no right to intervene
and therefore no diligent prosecution); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828,830
(W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984).
119. See Frilling, 924 F. Supp. at 841.
120. 631 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986).
121. See id. at 1294.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
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lenges to citizen suits arise will create a basic presumption in favor
of the state by placing the burden of proving a lack of diligent pros
ecution upon the citizens. This is true because citizens are required
to serve notice upon the violator and the Administrator in advance
of suit,123 This, of course, gives the defendants sixty or ninety days
to prepare a defense, including a motion to dismiss arguing that the
citizen action is precluded under the statute because the state or
federal government is already diligently prosecuting an action.
Even though it is the defendant's motion to dismiss, the burden
of proof with respect to the issue of diligent prosecution will effec
tively remain with the citizen plaintiffs because it is a necessary ele
ment of the statute itself to be affirmatively proven by the
plaintiff. 124 Furthermore, there is a common law presumption of
government regularity that reinforces the conclusion that a citizen
plaintiff had better be prepared to prove that the state is not dili
gently enforcing its environmental laws and not expect that the
state will have to affirmatively demonstrate the effectiveness of its
efforts.125
In this regard, note the ruling in Orange Environment, Inc. ·v.
County of Orange .126 In this case, the court acknowledged that the
state's initial efforts to require compliance were stymied "by the
recalcitrant and cavalier attitude adopted by the [defendant and]
that the [defendant] consistently failed to comply with the terms of
the Consent Orders."127 However, the court found that the state's
enforcement efforts ultimately barred a citizen suit, primarily be
cause "the standard for evaluating the diligence of the state in en
forcing its action is a low one which requires due deference to the
state's plan of attack ...."128 The court cited no support for this
statement.
It should be noted that a citizens group should not expect an
enthusiastic judicial reception to an attempt to litigate an issue with
a defendant with whom the regulatory agency has already entered
into a settlement agreement. For example, in Arkansas Wildlife
Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 129 the state agency issued an order
123.
124.
125.
1979).
126.
127.
128.
129.

See 33 U.S.c. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994); see also sources cited supra note 11.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
See, e.g., Leib v. Board of Exam'rs for Nursing, 411 A.2d 42, 46 (Conn.

860 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Id. at 1017.
Id.
29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994).
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which the polluter agreed to follow.130 The agency did allow third
party involvement and subjected the violator to various
penalties. 131
The citizens group, however, argued that only insignificant
penalties had been extended and that compliance had been delayed
repeatedly.1 32 The court concluded that citizens suits are intended
to play an "'interstitial,' rather than 'potentially intrusive' role,
[and] that such suits are proper only when the federal, state, or local
agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility and that
such suits should not considerably curtail the governing agency's
discretion to act in the public interest."133 With respect to the alle
gations that the polluter was being treated too leniently, the judge
added that "[i]t would be unreasonable and inappropriate to find
failure to diligently prosecute simply because leI prevailed in some
fashion or because a compromise was reached."134 The court con
cluded that the order acted as a bar to citizen enforcement. 135
Particularly interesting was the court's unwillingness to curtail
the administrator's discretion to implement a plan. Implicit in this
policy is the court's reliance on two principles. The first is that citi
zen suits are designed to assist government enforcement, not ob
struct it. The second is that it makes poor public policy to squander
limited judicial resources in re-litigating environmental matters that
have already been addressed. As one court described it in Gardeski
v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 136 "[ t]o require an agency to com
mence any form of proceeding would be senseless where the agency
has already succeeded in obtaining the respondent's agreement to
comply with the law in some enforceable form. "137
Some federal courts have allowed citizen suits to proceed, even
when state or federal agencies were in the process of actually liti
gating suits against polluters. For instance, suits were allowed
under the following circumstances: (i) when the enforcement
agency's suit did not address the same factual matters as the private
suits;138 (ii) when the public had no right to intervene in the
130. See id. at 378.
131. See id. at 380.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. /d.
135. See id. at 382.
136. 501 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
137. Id. at 1166.
138. See Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp.
1044, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (providing that if government is actively pursuing an
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agency's action;139 and (iii) when the relief sought by the citizen
plaintiffs could not be afforded by the agency's actions.140

5.

Review of the Decisional Law

Even a brief review of the decisional law demonstrates that it is
unlikely that a regulatory agency will be found to be diligently pros
ecuting an enforcement action if the following criteria are met: (i)
there is a past history of noncompliance with consent orders and/or
agency indifference generally;141 (ii) actual financial penalties are a
tiny fraction of potential penalties;142 (iii) private parties are func
tionally precluded from commenting or intervening;143 (iv) the con
sent agreements contain generous deadlines for compliance;144 and
(v) the relationship between regulator and regulated appears to be
overly familiar, especially if the polluter is given carte blanche to
draft consent documents. 145
Citizen plaintiffs can, however, expect an uphill battle. Some
courts have concluded, based upon existing precedent and legisla
tive history, that there is a preference in the environmental laws in
favor of government enforcement. 146 This may be in order to foster
national uniformity of environmental action, or possibly because of
a belief, founded in New Deal logic of the 1930's, that administra
tive agencies are the institutions with the necessary technical com
petence to address complex and difficult issues. Whatever the
theoretical basis, the result is that private parties may confront an
ideological predilection on the part of the judiciary in favor of gov
action, a citizen cannot get "personalized" relief, but stating that if the government's
efforts do not address the same violations, a citizen suit may proceed).
139. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) , Inc., 890 F.
Supp. 470, 489-90 (D.S.C. 1995) (no right to intervene and therefore no diligent prose
cution); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 572 F. Supp. 828, 830 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 747
F.2d 99 (2d CiT. 1984).
140. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 735
F. Supp. 1404, 1414-15 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (state agency lacked power to provide relief,
citizen suit allowed).
141. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Dep't of Sanita
tion, 772 F. Supp. 162,169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
142. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F.
Supp. at 491.
143. See Frilling v. Village of Anna, 924 F. Supp. 821, 841 (S.D. Ohio 1996);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 491.
144. See New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 169.
145. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 890 F.
Supp. at 491; New York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 169.
146. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. 484 U.S.
49, 59-60 (1989).

334

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:311

ernment, as opposed to private, enforcement action. This, com
bined with an often cool reception to private endeavors on the part
of the regulators themselves, and a sincerely held belief by some in
government that industry is being crippled by complex and confus
ing environmental regulations, means that the citizen plaintiff at
tempting to halt violations of state or federal law is best advised to
put on a credible case, very early in the litigation process, to con
vi.nce a judge that the regulators have conspicuously failed to fulfill
their duties and need to be given a strong nudge.
Finally, it should be noted that permitting private enforcement
actions to continue in the face of ongoing state or federal initiatives
could arguably contravene a key element of national environmental
policy. Specifically, federal environmental laws are designed to
provide a single, uniform national environmental standard. 147 If in
dividual citizen actions at cross-purposes to government initiatives
are allowed to continue, this will result inevitably in the creation of
three separate and conflicting enforcement authorities (state, fed
eral, and private) for each environmental issue. One court has even
spoken of the threat of "balkanizing" enforcement authority in
these circumstances148 and another has warned that citizen suits al
low private parties to "commandeer the federal enforcement ma
chinery"149 for their own private purposes.
C.

Non-Statutory Challenges

In a small number of cases, defendants have raised, in addition
to the statutory challenges of notice and diligent prosecution,
several related common law doctrines, such as exhaustion of admin
istrative remedies,150 primary jurisdiction,151 mootness,152 absten
147. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 643, 646 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
148. Sierra Club v. Colorado Ref. Co., 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1994).
149. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300,1322 (S.D. Iowa
1997).
150. See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619
F.2d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 1980) (providing that sixty day notice requirement is a statutory
time limit and thus doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be used to
require more than sixty day period); United States v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 74 F.R.D.
104, 107 (D. Alaska 1977).
151. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 43 ERC 1224, 1229 (D. Kan.
1996). In Davies, the court denied a motion to dismiss on abstention and primary juris
diction grounds, but added the following: "It would ... make little practical sense. If
the court takes jurisdiction of a matter in midstream of the administrative process, there
is a good chance the result will either be a needless duplication of the agency's efforts or
conflicting orders as to how to go about remedying the situation." Id.; see also Avoy
elles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 920 (5th Cir. 1983) (providing
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tion,153 intervention,154 and, if the defendant is a government
agency, sovereign immunity.1 55 Most of these doctrines are, in a
sense, relatives of the diligent prosecution requirement.
Specifically, exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction are mirror images of each other.
The exhaustion requirement is involved if an administrative action
is pending on a matter over which the agency has authority.1 56 In
such cases a court is often deemed to be without jurisdiction to hear
the matter until the agency has finished its review. 157
Abstention is a similar doctrine that arises when a plaintiff
brings an action in federal court, but the state has a pending admin
istrative action.15S Primary jurisdiction is involved if an action is
not pending before an administrative agency but it appears to the
court that the matter is within the special expertise of the agency.
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable if raised first on appeal and
there is no evidence that agency intends to act); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v.
Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (holding that the doctrine of prinlary
jurisdiction is not applicable to questions within the competency of the court); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp.
1528, 1537 (D.N.J. 1984) (providing that the doctrine of prinlary jurisdiction is not ap
plicable to questions within the competency of the court).
152. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124,
128 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing citizen suit as moot where state action addressed same
violations); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
ultimate filing of a suit by the EPA does not moot issue of whether EPA administrator
should have sued company); Orange Env't, Inc. v. County of Orange, 923 F. Supp. 529,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (providing that compliance with EPA remediation order moots
claim for injunctive relief).
153. See Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir.
1995) (providing that abstention doctrine may be appropriately invoked); Ada-Cascade
Watch Co. v. Cascade Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897, 905-06 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding on specific facts of case that a federal court should abstain from second guess
ing a decision by a state agency that no other permits were needed); Davies, 43 ERC at
1229; see also Lake Carrier's Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Brewer v. City
of Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).
154. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 101 F.R.D. 451, 458-59
(W.D.N.Y.) (finding that permissive intervention under FED. R. Cry. P. 24 is not al
lowed when it would further complicate a complex case), affd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1984); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1080 n.7
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that intervention is not permitted under the RCRA imminent
endangerment provision), affd, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984).
155. See District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that federal courts can review an EPA veto of a state permit, but not an EPA
decision not to veto a state permit).
156. See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619
F.2d 231, 235-37 (3d Cir. 1980).
157. See id.
158. See Coalition for Health Concern, 60 F.3d at 1194.
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Courts, in this instance, will generally require plaintiffs first to bring
their case before the agency and then to court if necessary.159
Obviously, these doctrines are essentially prudential matters
which permit courts to shuttle complicated matters off to the rele
vant regulatory agencies. The reasons are obvious. In some cases,
courts lack the necessary technical expertise. 160 In others, it is sim
ply a reflection of the principle of federalism to defer to an existing
state proceeding.161 In any event, it is simply poor judicial economy
for a court to adjudicate a matter that is being, or should be, re
viewed by an appropriate administrative agency.
At first blush, these doctrines might appear to offer polluters
effective defenses. In practice, however, they are less than effective
because they only require courts to look to see if an agency is, or
should be, acting. This, of course, is precisely what the diligent
prosecution and notice requirements do. Ultimately, if the agency
. is notified and refuses to do anything, or an action is proceeding but
ineffectively, the doctrines do not divest a court of jurisdiction and
the case may proceed.
Similarly, with the issue of mootness, if the subject matter of a
dispute no longer exists, then a court has no power to hear the case,
for federal courts do not give advisory opinions. Thus, if an agency
compels a polluter to cease permanently (that is, the agency is dili
gent in its enforcement of the matter) then there is no case left
upon which to proceed. Mootness is even less of a defense for the
reason that, while wholly past violations will not support a citizen
suit,162 the time of relevance for determining mootness is the time
of filing of the SUit. 163 Therefore, compliance subsequent to the ini
tiation of a suit will not affect jurisdiction.
In sum, the occasional recourse made to these common law
doctrines poses little concern for citizen plaintiffs. The issues ad
dressed by these doctrines are in essence the same as those already
covered by the two statutory requirements of notice and diligent
prosecution. If the citizen group can meet the requirements listed
159. See Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1169
(E.D. Tenn. 1984).
160. See id. (acknowledging that an issue may require special competence of ad
ministrative agencies).
161. See Coalition for Health Concern, 60 F.3d at 1194 (finding that Kentucky had
an overriding interest in the protection of its environment).
162. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 58-59 (1987).
163. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525,
1537 (D.N.J. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995).
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in the text of the laws, these prudential matters will rarely prove to
be an additional barrier of substance.

III.

PROPOSALS

A review of the case law makes it abundantly clear that, more
than two decades after the initial enactment. of the relevant envi
ronmental statutes, the federal courts have failed to fashion a con
sistent and coherent body of law to guide public and private parties
with respect to when and how citizen suits may be applied to pro
tect human health, safety and the environment. The primary areas
of concern have involved the notice issue 164 and the diligent prose
cution requirement,165 as well as the question of the applicability of
various related common law and prudential doctrines. 166
The lack of consistency itself has created uncertainty which, in
turn, has the potential to cause considerable disruption in the activi
ties of environmental groups, government regulators and industry.
Further, it appears as though the central problem with the citizen
suit provisions (failure to define critical terms such as "diligent
prosecution") was the result of attempting to paper over Congress's
basic division during enactment of the Clean Air Act regarding the
proper role of citizen plaintiffs in environmental enforcement.
What was, for citizen activists and government regulators alike, a
tragedy with respect to the Clean Air Act, became black comedy
when Congress continued to use the same statutory language in
each succeeding environmental law.
Furthermore, though Congress cannot be faulted for failing to
recognize in 1972 that future lawyers would attempt to cloud the
citizen suit issue by raising collateral doctrines, such as abstention,
mootness, exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary juris
diction, it is inexcusable that, when the use of these doctrines be
came clear, Congress continued to ignore them in drafting
subsequent environmental legislation.
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has spoken
with respect to the notice issue in Hallstrom. 167 This decision, while
j

164. See generally Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989); Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chern. Co., 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995); City of New
York v. Anglebrook Ltd. Partnership, 891 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
165. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979); Stu
dent Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp.
1528, 1535-37 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
166. See supra notes 150-59.
167. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31 (holding that "the notice and sixty day delay
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not foreclosing controversy, has limited debate on this element.
However, the time has come for Congress, or the courts, to attempt
a long overdue resolution of the remaining areas of difficulty.
This is not to say, however, that all authorities agree that
change is needed. One commentator has even suggested that the
legislative refusal to spell out in detail the relationship between pri
vate and public enforcement efforts is for the best.
[I]t very well may be that the Congress did the right thing by
continuing the tension [between citizen as independent agent and
as conscience of the regulatory agencies], not attempting to re
solve it under a single consistent theory. Effective agency prods
may be in need of a credible power to go it alone; and useful
citizen scouts may work best when authorized to call in the
agency troops. Perhaps also the best mutual efforts of official
and unofficial enforcers over time requires an occasional setback
for each, as where the agency is allowed to steal the thunder of
the citizen initiative or is humiliated so thoroughly that a new
boldness arises out of the ashes of past disgrace. That the combi
nation of citizen as independent agent and as public conscience is
a plausible one is suggested by the critical and empirical work
that has been done on citizen action. For the most part, this de
scribes a process that is closer to an adrenaline than a muscle
mechanism. Citizen power is spent most usefully in initiatives
that result in reinvigoration, reconsideration, and eventual take
over by the responsible agency.168

As interesting as this position is, it utterly fails to comport with
the day-to-day reality of public and private enforcement operations,
let alone the economic realities of business. Put quite simply, law is
not practiced in a vacuum. Citizen suits may be a vital part of the
regulatory scheme, but they can be very expensive to initiate. For a
small neighborhood environmental group trying to preserve natural
resources in their community, a citizen suit can be a costly gamble.
Similarly, government regulators trying to decide which of sev
eral hundred cases they can afford (literally) to address cannot ac
cept having to set aside high priority cases to handle perhaps
important but secondary matters or, worse yet, having complex set
tlement discussions founder because of the well-meaning but poorly
timed efforts of third parties. Furthermore, it is self-evident that
uncertainty is a cost item for industry, a cost item that factors im
requirements are mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit under the
RCRA citizen suit provision").
168. RODGERS, supra note 18, at 64.
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mediately into jobs in a globally interconnected commercial envi
ronment. This is particularly true if one accepts that the
relationship of regulatory agency to regulated industry is not prop
erly one of predator to prey, but rather of symbiosis. Specifically,
the purpose of regulation is not to destroy or punish, but to protect
the environment-a goal that in general is best attained
cooperatively.
.
If, however, it were possible to propose such a standard, it is
suggested that citizens suits under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air
Act, CERCLA and section 7001(a)(1)(A) of RCRA should be pro
hibited if a state or federal administrative agency has (1) filed suit
in state or federal court under one of the above-referenced federal
laws or an analogous state statute offering substantially similar pen
alties and citizen participation provisions, (2) entered into a consent
order, filed in a state or federal court, addressing substantially the
same violations advanced in the citizen suit, or (3) filed with a state
or federal court an executed memorandum of understanding
describing, in detail, the terms to be included in the eventual con
sent order. It is stressed that any consent order or memorandum of
understanding under either options (2) or (3) should include clear
and specific procedures to ensure citizen participation and review,
fixed time schedules for compliance, and effective civil remedies
and default provisions.
The proposed standard is justifiable on several grounds and of
fers important advantages over the current state of the law. The
first option calls for a repetition of the terms of the statutes with
additional clarifying language explaining what a state statute must
include in order to be sufficiently similar to a federal law to bar a
citizen suit. The primary advantage offered by this additional lan
guage is that it would remove any ambiguity as to when an action
brought under a state law will bar a citizen suit under a federal law.
The removal of this ambiguity itself would be a benefit to defend
ants and plaintiffs alike because the mere existence of ambiguity
introduces uncertainty into a complex and expensive process.
It is therefore advanced that the citizen suit provisions of all
federal environmental laws be amended to state that a citizen suit is
barred by an action brought under a state law only if that law offers
penalties substantially similar to those available under the closest
analogous federal act (i.e., financial penalties within perhaps 10
20% of the federal law), includes citizen participation as of right,
and specifies whether attorneys' fees will be recoverable.
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The second option similarly builds on existing case law. Op
tion (2) would require Congress to amend the citizen suit provisions
to state expressly that a suit is barred if the relevant regulatory
agency and the violator have entered into a consent order which
covers the same violations, includes mandatory deadlines for
remediation, and imposes strict penalties for failure to meet those
deadlines. In addition, the consent order process must have
mandatory provisions for citizen participation as of right.
The advantage of option (2) has been identified in those courts
that have, in effect, already begun to employ it. As stated in North
& South Rivers Watershed Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate,
"[d]uplicative enforcement actions add little or nothing to compli
ance actions already underway, but do divert State resources away
from remedying violations in order to focus on the duplicative ef
fort. "169 In other words, if a regulatory agency has resolved an is
sue short of litigation by employing a consent order, the need for
any action by regulators or private citizens is gone. As one court
described it, "[t]o require an agency to commence any form of pro
ceeding would be senseless where the agency has already succeeded
in obtaining the respondent's agreement to comply with the law in
some enforceable form."17o
In addition to providing statutory support for the logical prop
osition of barring citizen suits when a consent order has been
achieved, option (2) also provides greater protection to citizen
groups by requiring regulators to give private parties the right to
participate, and prevents abuses such as were described in New
York Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York City Department of
Sanitation,171 where a court roundly criticized a state agency for
taking twelve years to rectify a problem while imposing only trivial
fines and granting repeated time extensions. l72
The third option, while apparently novel, simply provides a
mechanism for recognizing the realities of modern environmental
enforcement. As a general rule, a consent order is simply an agree
ment between the regulator and regulated which is subsequently
approved by a court. Naturally, courts have little involvement in

169.
170.
1980).
171.
172.

See North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n, 949 F.2d at 555-56.
Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (S.D.N.Y.
772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
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preparing such orders and rarely add to, or subtract from, the terms
thereof. 173
However, formal consent orders often take a considerable
amount of time and effort to prepare. Thus, some government
agencies prefer to use, whenever possible, memoranda of under
standing. These agreements can be much quicker to implement and
are still binding upon the parties. If such memoranda contain the
same terms and conditions as a consent order, these memoranda
can provide the same protection to the environment as a formal
consent order. If the parties have finalized all the important details
of an administrative' action, it should not matter precisely what
form is used, so long as the form chosen provides the necessary
protection to all parties, including the public, as described above.
The consequence of accepting this suggested approach fits well
with the purpose of citizen suits generally: namely, to allow private
parties to act only if government is unwilling or unable to do so.
Furthermore, it entirely preserves the right of individuals or organi
zations interested in protecting the environment either to intercede
in agency enforcement operations or to act on their own should the
agency decide not to do so. It is true that this proposal presupposes
that government can and will act decisively to protect the environ
ment. But, as one court noted, "[t]he government, representing so
ciety as a whole, is usually in the best position to vindicate societal
rights and interests."174 The government is certainly in a better po
sition to ensure the systematic application of a truly uniform na
tional standard and prevent segmenting or balkanizing the
enforcement of the nation's environmental laws. Primarily, how
ever, it offers one standard that is consistent with the language of
the statutes, the experience of administrative agencies, and the pur
pose and intent of citizen suits generally.

173. See United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 568 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (providing
that courts review consent orders for substantive fairness and reasonableness).
174. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (S.D. Iowa
1997).

